This study shows that market anomalies are stronger for stocks headquartered in states with a history of cross-sectional return predictability. Using a combined measure of mispricing based on 11 prominent anomaly strategies, I find that the level of mispricing for a firm's geographic peers predicts how mispriced the firm itself will be in the future. I find similar results when I consider industrial peers instead, but the effect of neither group is absorbed by the other. States in which firm mispricing is more prevalent are those experiencing relatively higher levels of local investor sentiment and better local macroeconomic conditions. Finally, evidence indicates that the predictability of mispricing based on geography and industry is concentrated on stocks with high levels of analyst forecasting errors.
Introduction
Firms with similar attributes can attract a common set of investors and experience common variations in discount rates. Parsons et al. (2017) , for example, argue that firm scrutiny by a common set of investors or analysts is, in fact, crucial for incorporating all information into prices. Additionally, they focus on industry and geography as two key firm attributes to show that a lack of scrutiny by the same group of investors can lead to a delayed reaction to peer information. However, commonality in investor clienteles can also mean that analysts' biases and behaviors are reflected in prices (Kumar et al., 2013), leading to firms with a specific common set of investors becoming mispriced. Industry and geography are particularly interesting firm attributes to investigate for this effect, because they have been widely shown to attract common market participants (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Kacperczyk et al.,
2005).
In this study, I explore whether a firm's industry and geography contain information about the firm's susceptibility to mispricing. In this context, mispricing is defined as the predictability of a firm's returns with respect to market anomalies. Market anomalies are cross-sectional patterns in stock returns that are not explained by asset pricing models. In many cases, these patterns take the form of certain stock characteristics that predict future stock returns in the cross section, without capturing an apparent source of systematic risk.
Several studies suggest that anomalies partly reflect mispricing; for example, Nagel (2005) and Stambaugh et al. (2015) demonstrate that anomalies are considerably more pronounced among stocks facing significant arbitrage risks and costs. Furthermore, overpricing is more prevalent than is underpricing in market anomalies, because many investors are reluctant or If a clientele effect leads to mispricing in specific regions or industries, this effect should be persistent, and, therefore, groups of firms that experience relatively higher levels of mispricing are likely to continue to be mispriced in the future. Explaining this empirically entails dividing the whole cross section of stock returns into smaller geographic and industrial cross sections and investigating the performance of anomalies within each one. My expectation is that I will be able to predict how well anomalies perform in the future for each stock based on their past performance within that stock's geographical region or industry. I investigate four hypotheses to explore whether geographic and industrial mispricing exists and why. First, I examine whether the level of mispricing for a firm's geographic or industrial peers can predict the firm's own mispricing in the future. This follows my argument from above that firms in the same region or industry are affected by the behaviors of their common investors, and, therefore, these firms are exposed to the same forces that can generate common mispricing. I find strong support for this prediction. A 1-standard-deviation increase in state-level mispricing measured over the previous 12 months increases the return predictability of anomalies by 0.045% on a monthly basis, whereas the corresponding figure for industry-level mispricing is 0.062%. Both results are highly statistically significant. Furthermore, when looking at the level of mispricing for each firm, I only consider that firm's peers in my calculations of geographic or industrial mispricing; if the firm itself is included, the results are even stronger.
Both industrial and geographic mispricing variables stay economically and statistically significant in a setting in which they are simultaneously considered. In other words, they are complementing effects; neither captures the other. I also show that these results are robust to a series of basic tests, including looking at subsamples and using alternative data filters. In addition, I control for a wide range of proxies for limits to arbitrage and find that my measures of geographic and industrial mispricing do more than just capture illiquidity or trading costs. Nevertheless, one could still cast doubt on the results by arguing that any other arbitrary way of grouping stocks would lead to the same findings. To address this concern, I run a simulation exercise in which I randomly assign firms to other states and industries and estimate results. I show that in less than 1% of simulated cases, I find outcomes with magnitudes larger than or equal to mine.
My second hypothesis predicts that the persistence of mispricing within certain regions or industries is due to overpriced stocks. Stambaugh et al. (2012) show that overpricing is the prevalent form of stock mispricing. Overpricing is more difficult to adjust, because of shortselling impediments. This being so, any predictable underpricing based on geography or industry is more likely to be adjusted by arbitragers. Consistent with these, I find that most mispriced states or industries are more likely to have overpriced stocks, not underpriced stocks, in the future. In fact, for state-level mispricing, future underpricing is not even statistically significant.
The last two hypotheses address the potential drivers of geographic or industrial mispricing. I consider the role played by analysts in my third hypothesis. Specifically, I build on Engelberg et al. (2017) and argue that analyst forecasting errors can potentially generate biased expectations leading to mispricing. Therefore, firms in the most mispriced industries or regions may be those that analysts do not value correctly. However, analysts are more likely to be clustered by industry than by geography (Parsons et al., 2017), and, therefore, I expect to observe a stronger role for analysts in generating industrial, rather than geographic, mispricing. My results indicate that industry-level mispricing is only significant for the subset of stocks with high analyst forecasting errors in the most recent period. A similar, although significantly weaker, result is observed for state-level mispricing. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature and develops the hypotheses; Section 3 summarizes the data and the main variables; Section 4 presents the main empirical results; Section 5 includes a series of robustness checks; and Section 6 concludes this paper.
Background and Hypotheses
I begin this section by summarizing the literature on the role of geography and industry in asset pricing. Then I develop a number of testable hypotheses to explore whether geography and industry can predict mispricing and why. 
Related Literature

Main Testable Hypotheses
I first examine whether the geography or the industry of a firm can predict its predisposition to mispricing; in other words, I look at whether firms in geographic regions or in industries with higher levels of cross-sectional mispricing are more mispriced in the future. I argue that any predictable pattern in the performance of anomalies within a certain geographical region or industry is due to mispricing generated by common investor clienteles.
My second hypothesis (H2 ) predicts that any mispricing-related return predictability based on geographic or industrial information is more likely to take the form of overpricing rather than underpricing. Here, the logic is that part of the reason return predictability is more prevalent and persistent in certain regions or in certain industries is that it includes overpriced stocks, the prices of which are more difficult to adjust because of short-selling impediments. 
Mispricing Measures
In this section, I briefly introduce my firm-, state-, and industry-level mispricing variables. 
where, R i,τ is the monthly return for firm i in month τ , AN M i,τ −1 is the monthly firm mispricing measure for firm i in month τ − 1, and Control n i,τ −1 is a monthly firm control variable. The estimated β 1g coefficient is the measure of state or industrial mispricing for each stock in the state or industry group g. To determine the out-of-sample performance of the mispricing measures, I estimate the state and industrial mispricing measures at the end of each month t by running the model in Equation (1) and require each group to have at least five nonmissing observations for at least 1 month.
Because some groups do not meet this criteria, because of missing ANM values, I exclude them from the sample altogether. I also exclude month-groups with less than five nonmissing observations; however, I compute the average number of observations, that is, N, in Table   1 before excluding these firm months. States and industries are sorted by their group mispricing measures, that is, GM and IM, estimated using the whole sample. That is, I run the regression in Equation (1) using all firm-months for each state and industry group. Higher GM and IM suggest more mispricing in the direction predicted by the anomaly variables.
As GM increases, I do not see visible trends in firm characteristics. Panel A of Table   1 The results in Panel B of Table 1 are very similar to those in Panel A; that is, the groups with the lowest and the highest IM do not have visibly different firm characteristics.
The figures fluctuate a lot from one industry to another, but do not follow a specific trend.
Industries with the lowest IM are coal, shipping containers, and tobacco products, whereas those with the highest IM are recreation, candy and soda, and other (uncategorized firms).
Overall, average firm characteristics do not indicate a fundamental difference between firms in various states or industries that can explain the heterogeneity in mispricing.
Empirical Results
In this section, I present the main empirical findings. I begin by testing whether mispricing is persistent and predictable across different geographic and industrial groups (H1 ).
Then I decompose geographic and industrial mispricing into overpricing and underpricing These results are also economically significant; for example, in the 12-month estimation specification (T =12), a 1-standard-deviation increase in the industry-level mispricing measured over the past 12 months increases the return predictability of ANM by 0.062% (t-statistic of 3.76).
It is interesting to observe that both GMX[t-T, include all firms in a state or in an industry when estimating the model in Equation (1).
Results based on these alternative measures are slightly stronger and more robust than those in Panels A and B. For example, the ANM × GM[t-T,t-1] coefficient for the 12-month estimation period (T =12) increases to 0.052% (t-statistic of 3.47) from 0.045% in Panel A.
Similarly, the ANM × IM[t-T,t-1] coefficient for the same specification is 0.076% (t-statistic of 4.1), which is larger than the 0.07% interaction coefficient in Panel B.
Overall, the results in Table 2 provide corroborative evidence for my first hypothesis (H1 ).
The combined anomaly variable (ANM ) generates larger future returns in states and in industries with a history of return predictability; in other words, the level of mispricing for a firm's geographic and industrial peers can predict the firm's own likelihood of being mispriced in the future. Persistence differs between the two categories; state-level mispricing loses its predictive power after 12 months, but industry-level mispricing predicts future mispricing even after 60 months. Korniotis and Kumar (2013) reports similar findings regarding the dissipation of state-level mispricing after 12 months.
State-Level versus Industry-Level Mispricing
In the previous subsection, I established that the level of mispricing in a firm's state or industry offers relevant information about its susceptibility to mispricing. Nevertheless, one might ask how the effects of state and industrial mispricing compare to each other.
A possible concern is the considerable overlap between states and industries, so state-and industry-level mispricing may be highly correlated. To address this concern, I include both the industry-and state-level interaction terms in the regression model. In this way, I am essentially examining the effect of one variable, while controlling for the other.
Results presented in Panel A of Table 3 are also very close to the original estimates in Table 2 .
These findings indicate that state-and industry-level mispricing variables do not explain each other. Both interaction terms remain robust after controlling for the other. In other words, past levels of state and industrial mispricing can predict future levels of mispricing for stocks independent of each other. This is in line with my prediction that the two group effects have different causes.
Are Mispriced States or Industries More Overpriced or Underpriced?
My second hypothesis (H2 ) predicts that any mispricing-related return predictability based on geographic or industrial information is more likely to be in the form of overpricing than underpricing. I test this conjecture by separately analyzing the effect of past stateand industry-level mispricing on overpriced and underpriced stocks. I sort stocks at the end of each month based on their ANM value into quintile portfolios; those in quintile 1 are categorized as underpriced, and those in quintile 5 as overpriced for the following month.
I then use SHORT and LONG dummies to identify overpriced and underpriced stocks,
respectively. These dummies are interacted with GMX[t-T,t-1] and IMX[t-T,t-1] instead of ANM. The coefficients on the interaction terms between GMX[t-T,t-1] or IMX[t-T,t-1]
and SHORT or LONG indicate whether past state-or industry-level mispricing can predict future overpricing or underpricing.
Panel A of Table 4 focuses on overpriced stocks. Note that the interaction and SHORT coefficients are all negative, because stocks in the SHORT portfolio generate lower future returns. Patterns in the interaction coefficients are similar to those in Table 2 ; that is, the Taken together, these results support H2 ; that is, the persistence and prevalence of mispricing in specific states or industries is mostly due to overpriced stocks. This also supports my main conjecture linking any variation in return predictability across states and industries to different levels of mispricing. 
The Role of Analysts
Sentiment and Local Risk Aversion
In my fourth and final hypothesis (H4 ), I consider heterogeneous state-wide sentiment and risk aversion as another possible explanation for state-wide mispricing. H4 states that state-level mispricing is greater in states experiencing higher levels of investor sentiment.
Before testing this hypothesis, however, I look at the effect of national sentiment in generating Table 7 indicate that the two interaction coefficients are only statistically significant at the 1% level in periods of high NSENT, whereas the magnitudes of the interaction coefficients in high NSENT periods are twice those in low NSENT periods. Nevertheless, the differences in the interaction coefficients of the two subsamples are not statistically significant, even at the 5% level. This indicates that one cannot reliably draw a conclusion that national sentiment affects state-or industry-level mispricing.
After gaining some insight into the role of national sentiment, I focus on local, that is, state-wide, variations in sentiment and test H4. I use two main proxies for local sentiment. Table   2 , using several additional tests. Table 9 summarizes the results from these robustness tests.
I focus on the coefficients in Panel A of Table 2 The results in Panel A of Table 9 indicate that the interaction coefficient estimates are robust for the sample excluding stocks cheaper than $5, the largest and smallest quantiles of stocks, and the expansion and recession subsamples, defined using the NBER Recession Another concern regarding the results in Table 2 is that the state-and industry-level mispricing variables simply act as a proxy for liquidity or arbitrage costs. It is well documented that market anomalies and mispricing in general are more prevalent among stocks that are . This being so, most mispriced states or industries could continue to be mispriced, because they happen to include stocks that face significant limits to arbitrage, rather than necessarily being exposed to forces related to their geographic or industrial identity.
I control for the effects of limits to arbitrage by adding five commonly used proxies and their interactions with ANM to the regression in 
Robustness Simulations
In the previous subsection, I showed that the main results in Table 2 are robust to a range of simple robustness tests and controls for limits to arbitrage. However, this does not fully address all the identification concerns regarding the state-and the industry-level mispricing variables. One could argue that these two variables predict future mispricing simply for spurious reasons; after all, some firms tend to be more mispriced than others and continue to be that way. Specific state or industry groups could be more mispriced simply because they randomly include the most mispriced firms, regardless of the characteristics of the state or industry. In other words, it might be possible to observe the same pattern in my data after repeating the exercise for any other method of grouping firms not necessarily linked to firms' geography or industry. has a larger gap with the 99th percentile threshold. Figure 1 plots the simulations as a his-
togram. Again, it is visually clear that the actual coefficients (panels a and c) and t-statistics
(panels b and d) are far to the right of the 1% threshold.
In summary, my simulation results indicate that the probability of any random groups of stocks yielding the same results as those presented in Table 2 
Conclusion
This study has investigated whether the geography or industry characteristics of a firm can affect its mispricing, as captured by market anomalies. Using a composite mispricing measure based on 11 anomaly strategies, I show that states or industries experiencing higher levels of cross-sectional mispricing are more likely to have mispriced firms in future periods.
I also observe that mispricing is predictable within geographical regions and industries, primarily because of the effect of overpriced stocks, the prices of which are more difficult to adjust as a result of short-selling costs. Underpriced stocks also play a role in my results, but to a much lesser extent.
These findings are robust to several different specifications, treatments, and controls and offer potentially important practical implications. For example, my results indicate that anomaly strategies could be refined by considering the performance of the firm's regional or geographic peers, whereas geographic mispricing and industrial mispricing are independent of one another and provide complementary information about a firm's future mispricing. This being so, both should be simultaneously accounted for, to fully exploit the phenomenon. 
. Histogram of Simulated Coefficients
This figure presents the simulated coefficients summarized in Table 5 This table presents estimates from the monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. At the end of each month t, I use a set of independent variables including stock characteristics and my mispricing measures to predict the stock returns for month t + 1. My primary independent variable is the interaction between the combined anomaly variable, ANM, and GMX[t-T,t-1] or IMX[t-T,t-1]. For each stock, GMX[t-T,t-1] and IMX[t-T,t-1] measure the past return predictability of ANM from month t − T to t − 1 within that stock's state and industry peers, respectively. Table A -0.633*** -0.638*** -0.639*** -0.639*** -0.639*** -0.638*** -0.638*** (-10.97) (-11.10) (-11.09) (-11.10) (-11.10) (-11.06) (-11.06) Table 2 , with the difference that the LONG and SHORT dummies are used instead of ANM. LONG and SHORT are defined as dummy variables equal to 1 if a stock is in ANM quintiles 5 and 1, respectively, and 0 otherwise. ANM quintiles are defined based on the most recent ANM score available at the end of the previous month. This table presents the Fama-MacBeth regression estimates for two subsamples of stocks formed based on their absolute forecasting errors (AFE). The subsamples are formed by sorting stocks every month, based on their most recent AFE values, into two groups. I then take the regression specifications in Table 3 and estimate them for each of the two subsamples. Table A .1 explains the construction details of all variables. For brevity, I exclude the intercept and control variable estimates. All independent variables in the regressions are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1 and are winsorized at their 0.5 and 99.5 percentile levels. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey and West (1987) approach. The sample excludes penny stocks and covers January 1990 to December 2017. Table 3 and estimate them for the two subsamples. Table 3 and estimate them for each of the two subsamples. The investor sentiment index for each state, computed by taking the first principal component of four time-series proxies for sentiment, following Baker et al. (2012) . The four sentiment proxies are (1) the volatility premium, defined as the ratio of the value-weighted average market-tobook ratio of stocks in the top-three state volatility deciles to that of the stocks in the bottom-three state volatility deciles. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of capital asset pricing model (CAPM) residuals estimated using the past 12 months of returns; (2) the number of IPOs in that state during the previous 12 months; (3) the average first-day returns of IPOs during the past 12 months; and (4) the state turnover computed as the log of total turnover (total dollar volume of all stocks headquartered in the state over the year, divided by total capitalization at the end of the prior year), detrended with the 5-year moving average. 
